I direct tournament games at the Manhattan Bridge Club, usually once or twice a week and occasionally more often. The games I run are mostly what we call “299ers”, limited to players with less than 300 masterpoints. (In practice, I generally set the top strat to non-Life Master, and allow in some players who are a little over the 300 limit but whose standard of play is appropriate). Before each 299er game, there is a lecture, about half an hour long. The lectures are free and open to all, but the 299er players are the target audience. Sometimes one of the regular teaching staff gives the lecture. And sometimes, I have to give the lecture myself.
Now, I have had a career as a software developer and analyst, and I’ve had to make presentations to management, users, and subordinates. It wasn’t necessarily my favorite thing to do, but I got by. But a teaching presentation is a little different, and I don’t mind admitting that I’ve had some trouble finding my - well, groove, for lack of a better term.
The topic of the lecture is, quite literally, anything the lecturer wants to talk about. There may be a few things that deserve a talk. For example, if I could get them all to understand (and use) the Losing Trick Count, I’m sure that their bidding would improve dramatically in the area of getting high enough when appropriate and staying low enough when the warning flags are out. But that’s a bit much to get across in a 25 minute talk. I’ve seen at least two of the teaching staff try it, and as straightforward as the LTC is, you still have to talk fast to get across all you want in the time-frame. And there’s no time left over for some example hands and bidding sequences, which is actually pretty critical stuff for a decent teaching effort. These days, I’m starting to follow the lead of Jeff Bayone, the owner of MBC. Jeff sometimes gives the lecture himself, and he doesn’t have a topic. One of his lectures is all about a hand. Just one hand, and the interest is usually not the bidding. It’s all about the play.
That sounds like it could be boring or repetitive. Or it could easily drift into techniques that are beyond the grasp of the intermediate players who are the audience. All of those dangers are real, but at the same time, there is plenty of scope for some interesting stuff that they really need. From declarer’s side, everything that Mike Lawrence wrote about reading the opponent’s cards is relevant, and well within their capabilities. So are some basic ideas around avoidance, suit establishment, card combinations, safety plays, and so on. From the defensive side, I’m not so sure (I’ve not tried a defensive lecture yet). I think it should be possible, though. There must be some hands that have enough points of interest to last 25 minutes! You need more than just one critical lead or switch to focus on, so I’m thinking perhaps a no-trump part-score will have two or three points to make.
Which leads to the next question: where do you get the hands from? I don’t really like to use composed deals to make a point in this sort of format. If I’m going to stand in front of a room full of people and chat about a hand, I want to be able to say “Here’s a hand from Houston last week” or “Here’s something that came up Thursday evening”, or something like that. But I don’t seem to be able to spot the right sort of teaching material as it comes up, at least, not yet. I’m hoping I get better at this with practice.
Saturday, March 28, 2009
Friday, March 27, 2009
I haven’t been posting because I’ve been a bit busy, one way and another. But today’s laundry day, so I might as well put something up between visits to the basement.
It’s STAC week again, and I’m trying to gather in the 11 or so silver points I need for Life Master. So far I’ve not had too much success, but there have been some wild hands and even wilder opposition. A session with Agent 99 started slowly but accelerated when one pair of opponents perpetrated this horror show.
Love all, dlr S
♠ A Q 9 7
♥ K 9 8 3
♦ 8 7 5
♣ A 3
♠ 8 6 5 4 3 2 ♠ -
♥ 4 [ ] ♥ 10 7 2
♦ A 10 6 2 ♦ J 9 4 3
♣ K 9 ♣ Q 10 8 5 4 2
♠ K J 10
♥ A Q J 6 5
♦ K Q
♣ J 7 6
S W N E
1♥ pass 1♠ pass
2NT pass 6♥ dble
All pass
I don’t know exactly how N-S should bid in their methods, but I’m confident that both of them overbid in practice. I don’t think the South hand is too strong to open 1NT 15-17, and North was in too much of a hurry. If she had gone slower, maybe South could have talked her out of it. Agent 99 started with the ♦A, so only 2 down, but that was a top.
That was the last board against them, so we moved to a new table and this was the next board.
Game all, dlr W
♠ Q 5
♥ 9 5 4
♦ A Q 10 7 4 2
♣ 6 4
♠ J 9 8 ♠ K 10 6
♥ A K Q 2 [ ] ♥ 8 7 3
♦ J 9 6 ♦ 8 3
♣ J 8 3 ♣ A Q 10 7 5
♠ A 7 4 3 2
♥ J 10 6
♦ K 5
♣ K 9 2
W N E S
1NT pass pass 2♠
pass pass 3♣ pass
pass 3♠ dble All pass
The above auction isn’t the whole story, not even close to it. South actually overcalled 1♠, and when this was pointed out to be insufficient, corrected to 2♠. I asked North what they were playing over opponent’s no-trumps, and she said Cappelletti, so I called the director, but before the director arrived, South commented that they played Capp over strong no-trumps but hadn’t discussed weak ones.
That makes a bit of a mess. You can’t just make an insufficient bid minimally sufficient without penalty if the result would be conventional, and a Capp 2♠ would show spades plus a minor suit. And North now has the somewhat unauthorized information that South only intended 2♠ as natural. On the other hand, the point about not having discussed weak no-trumps specifically is valid: the director could decide that without a specific agreement to play Capp on their card, making the bid sufficient to a natural 2♠ could be allowed without penalty. Rather than get into a big hypothetical argument, I suggested to the director that we let things go and see how it all turned out. He agreed, adding a specific warning to North that she should bid as if all she had seen or heard was the 1NT and the 2♠.
I pictured a somewhat more robust suit in the South hand, for which my ♠K-10 seemed to be well-placed (as far as South was concerned). On the other hand, I didn’t want to sell out, so I bid 3♣. At that point, South has just pushed us from a hopeless contract to our best spot. North wasn’t finished, though. Holding diamonds and hearing me bid clubs, she decided that there was enough evidence that South was single-suited in spades. True enough, but why she raised spades without mentioning diamonds I don’t know. I did know that I couldn’t let them play undoubled, however.
Now, throughout all this, Agent 99 is sitting looking at a hand full of jacks and figuring that whatever the opponents bid, they are probably making overtricks. But she kept a good poker face, and while I can’t remember the exact sequence of play, she did lead the 13th heart at some point for me to uppercut with the ♠10 and get 3 down for 800.
Was justice done? I think so. I know South didn’t want to sell out to 1NT, but that overcall was pretty disgusting, really.
It’s STAC week again, and I’m trying to gather in the 11 or so silver points I need for Life Master. So far I’ve not had too much success, but there have been some wild hands and even wilder opposition. A session with Agent 99 started slowly but accelerated when one pair of opponents perpetrated this horror show.
Love all, dlr S
♠ A Q 9 7
♥ K 9 8 3
♦ 8 7 5
♣ A 3
♠ 8 6 5 4 3 2 ♠ -
♥ 4 [ ] ♥ 10 7 2
♦ A 10 6 2 ♦ J 9 4 3
♣ K 9 ♣ Q 10 8 5 4 2
♠ K J 10
♥ A Q J 6 5
♦ K Q
♣ J 7 6
S W N E
1♥ pass 1♠ pass
2NT pass 6♥ dble
All pass
I don’t know exactly how N-S should bid in their methods, but I’m confident that both of them overbid in practice. I don’t think the South hand is too strong to open 1NT 15-17, and North was in too much of a hurry. If she had gone slower, maybe South could have talked her out of it. Agent 99 started with the ♦A, so only 2 down, but that was a top.
That was the last board against them, so we moved to a new table and this was the next board.
Game all, dlr W
♠ Q 5
♥ 9 5 4
♦ A Q 10 7 4 2
♣ 6 4
♠ J 9 8 ♠ K 10 6
♥ A K Q 2 [ ] ♥ 8 7 3
♦ J 9 6 ♦ 8 3
♣ J 8 3 ♣ A Q 10 7 5
♠ A 7 4 3 2
♥ J 10 6
♦ K 5
♣ K 9 2
W N E S
1NT pass pass 2♠
pass pass 3♣ pass
pass 3♠ dble All pass
The above auction isn’t the whole story, not even close to it. South actually overcalled 1♠, and when this was pointed out to be insufficient, corrected to 2♠. I asked North what they were playing over opponent’s no-trumps, and she said Cappelletti, so I called the director, but before the director arrived, South commented that they played Capp over strong no-trumps but hadn’t discussed weak ones.
That makes a bit of a mess. You can’t just make an insufficient bid minimally sufficient without penalty if the result would be conventional, and a Capp 2♠ would show spades plus a minor suit. And North now has the somewhat unauthorized information that South only intended 2♠ as natural. On the other hand, the point about not having discussed weak no-trumps specifically is valid: the director could decide that without a specific agreement to play Capp on their card, making the bid sufficient to a natural 2♠ could be allowed without penalty. Rather than get into a big hypothetical argument, I suggested to the director that we let things go and see how it all turned out. He agreed, adding a specific warning to North that she should bid as if all she had seen or heard was the 1NT and the 2♠.
I pictured a somewhat more robust suit in the South hand, for which my ♠K-10 seemed to be well-placed (as far as South was concerned). On the other hand, I didn’t want to sell out, so I bid 3♣. At that point, South has just pushed us from a hopeless contract to our best spot. North wasn’t finished, though. Holding diamonds and hearing me bid clubs, she decided that there was enough evidence that South was single-suited in spades. True enough, but why she raised spades without mentioning diamonds I don’t know. I did know that I couldn’t let them play undoubled, however.
Now, throughout all this, Agent 99 is sitting looking at a hand full of jacks and figuring that whatever the opponents bid, they are probably making overtricks. But she kept a good poker face, and while I can’t remember the exact sequence of play, she did lead the 13th heart at some point for me to uppercut with the ♠10 and get 3 down for 800.
Was justice done? I think so. I know South didn’t want to sell out to 1NT, but that overcall was pretty disgusting, really.
Friday, February 13, 2009
Hands
Here are a few hands from the past couple of weeks, more or less at random. First, a couple of items that came up in the Grand National Teams.
You pick up
♠ x x x
♥ -
♦ A K 10 9 x x x x
♣ x x
and hear partner open 2♥ (as partners will). RHO passes - what do you do? I think your only choice is to pass. Partner went quietly two down, which was an OK result (a small gain, I think). Bidding 3♦ would be forcing, so if you try it, you will probably finish in 5♦, and the higher-level contract will offset any extra tricks you might make. We play lead-directing bids after a double, but if the auction starts
2♥ - (pass) – pass – (double);
pass – (pass) – 3♦
that obviously doesn’t apply: the opponents are trying to penalize you in 2♥, so you can’t be raising to 3♥. In this situation, 3♦ must be to play, and that means you can escape to your eight-card suit if things turn nasty.
This hand was a source of discussion:
♠ x x x
♥ J 10 x x x
♦ Q 8
♣ x x x
At our table, this hand was opposite a 2♣ opener that rebid 2NT to show about 24hcp. Do you mention the heart suit, or just bid 3NT? Our opponent simply bid 3NT, which made.
At the other table, the dealer psyched a 1♠ opening, the strong hand doubled, and over the 2♥ reply jumped to 3NT. After spending some time in the tank, our team-mate decided to pull this to 4♥. On the day, this was wrong, since 4♥ went one down and 13 IMPs went the wrong way. Probably he shouldn’t have done it, but on another day, 4♥ would make and 3NT would go down. Who knows?
At the Manhattan the other day, I was directing the Wednesday afternoon 299er (limited to players with less than 300 master points). I had to actually play, to complete a table, and so I came to pick up this hand:
♠ A 5
♥ K Q J 6
♦ A K 10 3 2
♣ J 10
Not a bad collection, much better than I usually get. So of course the auction got messy.
N me S W
2♠ Dbl Pass 3♥
Pass 4♥ 4♠ Pass
Pass Dbl All pass
Doesn’t a double seem reasonable? You have four quick tricks for defence, and you are missing some big cards for offence. Partner has basically shown nothing.
N-S game, dlr N
♠ K J 9 7 4 2
♥ 10 8 4
♦ -
♣ 8 5 4 3
♠ 6 ♠ A 5
♥ A 7 5 3 2 [ ] ♥ K Q J 6
♦ Q J 6 5 ♦ A K 10 3 2
♣ 9 6 2 ♣ J 10
♠ Q 10 8 3
♥ 9
♦ 9 8 7 4
♣ A K Q 7
Yep, South has played you for a sucker. That adds up to -990. I tell you, I get no respect from these 299ers.
In the Thursday night pairs, we overcame some obstructive bidding to get to a fair slam.
♠ K J 9 2
♥ K 9 3 2
♦ J
♣ Q 8 5 4
[]
♠ A 6 4
♥ A 4
♦ A K
♣ K J 10 9 6 2
W N E S
Pass Pass 1♥ Dble
2♦ 2♠ Pass 3♣
Pass 4♣ Pass 6♣
All pass
Trick one is the ♦10, covered by jack, queen and ace, and I pause to take stock.
There are only 11hcp missing, so clearly east’s 3rd-seat opening was very light. And where did the 2♦ reply come from? West must have virtually no points, so the diamond suit must be very long, seven or eight cards probably.
Drawing trumps must come first, so I lead the J♣, ducked all round, and then put East in with another club. She gets off lead with the ♥Q, taken by the ace as west follows with the ♥8. Both opponents follow to the ♦K, dummy discarding the ♠2.
I think that if West had a singleton heart, he would have led it, so that places him with two (or possibly even three) hearts, to go with his club and his long diamonds. It is just possible for him to hold three spades to the queen, but I don’t believe it. I think East has four spades to go with her heart suit. So I cash three more clubs, discarding the ♠9 on the third one. West ditches diamonds, naturally, while East parts with one heart and (somewhat reluctantly) two spades. Now the ♥K and a heart ruff exposes the distribution, and I know that the remaining spades are 2-2. The ♠6 takes the last trick.
♠ K J 9 2
♥ K 9 3 2
♦ J
♣ Q 8 5 4
♠ Q 10 ♠ 8 7 5 3
♥ 8 5 [ ] ♥ Q J 10 7 6
♦ 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 ♦ Q 3
♣ 7 ♣ A 5
♠ A 6 4
♥ A 4
♦ A K
♣ K J 10 9 6 2
Of course, the stupid ♠Q was doubleton all along.
You pick up
♠ x x x
♥ -
♦ A K 10 9 x x x x
♣ x x
and hear partner open 2♥ (as partners will). RHO passes - what do you do? I think your only choice is to pass. Partner went quietly two down, which was an OK result (a small gain, I think). Bidding 3♦ would be forcing, so if you try it, you will probably finish in 5♦, and the higher-level contract will offset any extra tricks you might make. We play lead-directing bids after a double, but if the auction starts
2♥ - (pass) – pass – (double);
pass – (pass) – 3♦
that obviously doesn’t apply: the opponents are trying to penalize you in 2♥, so you can’t be raising to 3♥. In this situation, 3♦ must be to play, and that means you can escape to your eight-card suit if things turn nasty.
This hand was a source of discussion:
♠ x x x
♥ J 10 x x x
♦ Q 8
♣ x x x
At our table, this hand was opposite a 2♣ opener that rebid 2NT to show about 24hcp. Do you mention the heart suit, or just bid 3NT? Our opponent simply bid 3NT, which made.
At the other table, the dealer psyched a 1♠ opening, the strong hand doubled, and over the 2♥ reply jumped to 3NT. After spending some time in the tank, our team-mate decided to pull this to 4♥. On the day, this was wrong, since 4♥ went one down and 13 IMPs went the wrong way. Probably he shouldn’t have done it, but on another day, 4♥ would make and 3NT would go down. Who knows?
At the Manhattan the other day, I was directing the Wednesday afternoon 299er (limited to players with less than 300 master points). I had to actually play, to complete a table, and so I came to pick up this hand:
♠ A 5
♥ K Q J 6
♦ A K 10 3 2
♣ J 10
Not a bad collection, much better than I usually get. So of course the auction got messy.
N me S W
2♠ Dbl Pass 3♥
Pass 4♥ 4♠ Pass
Pass Dbl All pass
Doesn’t a double seem reasonable? You have four quick tricks for defence, and you are missing some big cards for offence. Partner has basically shown nothing.
N-S game, dlr N
♠ K J 9 7 4 2
♥ 10 8 4
♦ -
♣ 8 5 4 3
♠ 6 ♠ A 5
♥ A 7 5 3 2 [ ] ♥ K Q J 6
♦ Q J 6 5 ♦ A K 10 3 2
♣ 9 6 2 ♣ J 10
♠ Q 10 8 3
♥ 9
♦ 9 8 7 4
♣ A K Q 7
Yep, South has played you for a sucker. That adds up to -990. I tell you, I get no respect from these 299ers.
In the Thursday night pairs, we overcame some obstructive bidding to get to a fair slam.
♠ K J 9 2
♥ K 9 3 2
♦ J
♣ Q 8 5 4
[]
♠ A 6 4
♥ A 4
♦ A K
♣ K J 10 9 6 2
W N E S
Pass Pass 1♥ Dble
2♦ 2♠ Pass 3♣
Pass 4♣ Pass 6♣
All pass
Trick one is the ♦10, covered by jack, queen and ace, and I pause to take stock.
There are only 11hcp missing, so clearly east’s 3rd-seat opening was very light. And where did the 2♦ reply come from? West must have virtually no points, so the diamond suit must be very long, seven or eight cards probably.
Drawing trumps must come first, so I lead the J♣, ducked all round, and then put East in with another club. She gets off lead with the ♥Q, taken by the ace as west follows with the ♥8. Both opponents follow to the ♦K, dummy discarding the ♠2.
I think that if West had a singleton heart, he would have led it, so that places him with two (or possibly even three) hearts, to go with his club and his long diamonds. It is just possible for him to hold three spades to the queen, but I don’t believe it. I think East has four spades to go with her heart suit. So I cash three more clubs, discarding the ♠9 on the third one. West ditches diamonds, naturally, while East parts with one heart and (somewhat reluctantly) two spades. Now the ♥K and a heart ruff exposes the distribution, and I know that the remaining spades are 2-2. The ♠6 takes the last trick.
♠ K J 9 2
♥ K 9 3 2
♦ J
♣ Q 8 5 4
♠ Q 10 ♠ 8 7 5 3
♥ 8 5 [ ] ♥ Q J 10 7 6
♦ 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 ♦ Q 3
♣ 7 ♣ A 5
♠ A 6 4
♥ A 4
♦ A K
♣ K J 10 9 6 2
Of course, the stupid ♠Q was doubleton all along.
Monday, February 9, 2009
GNT
I’ve been a bit busy the past few weeks, one way and another. Part of the busy-ness was working towards flight B of the Grand National Teams. Since we did so well at the regional, Elwood and I decided to stick with the same team for the GNT. The opening salvo was yesterday, but sadly the team’s performance was not up to snuff, and we got knocked out.
It was very disappointing. We were in a three-way match, playing 24 boards against each team, and all three teams won one match and lost one match. The tie was then broken by total IMPs. One team was positive, one totaled -3 IMPs, and we finished at -10. But we actually beat the team that finished positive, and lost to the team that finished at -3.
What was particularly galling was that Elwood and I were distinctly unimpressed with the pair at our table, who seemed to be a scratch partnership with unclear bidding agreements, and one of them also displaying distinctly questionable judgement. But in the second quarter, he punted four times in the six boards, and generated about +25 IMPs when some unlikely games made. We got some swings back from boards where his optimism ran into normal luck, but the damage was done. Either his team-mates at the other table were good, or our team-mates had a bit of a bad day, (or more likely, a bit of both), but in the sessions where Elwood and I felt we had done well and expected to get some ground back, the gains didn’t materialize. Now, the elimination margin was 7 IMPs, but that was between us and them. So in fact, if we had managed a 4 IMP swing somewhere, +4 to us and -4 to them would have squeaked us through. In twenty four boards, there can’t have been more than about a dozen opportunities for such a swing.
Meanwhile, the third team comprised fellow Manhattan Bridge Clubbers, and Elwood and I were a little nervous about facing them, judging them to be a pretty strong team by flight B standards. And yet we did to them what the other team did to us, score-wise. A big second quarter opened a lead that they never looked like closing. In this case, the swings came from a misplayed game and from better judgement in the bidding. We got swings of 6, 5, and 4 IMPs by going plus at both tables when the pair at our table over-reached or over-competed.
Oh well.
It was very disappointing. We were in a three-way match, playing 24 boards against each team, and all three teams won one match and lost one match. The tie was then broken by total IMPs. One team was positive, one totaled -3 IMPs, and we finished at -10. But we actually beat the team that finished positive, and lost to the team that finished at -3.
What was particularly galling was that Elwood and I were distinctly unimpressed with the pair at our table, who seemed to be a scratch partnership with unclear bidding agreements, and one of them also displaying distinctly questionable judgement. But in the second quarter, he punted four times in the six boards, and generated about +25 IMPs when some unlikely games made. We got some swings back from boards where his optimism ran into normal luck, but the damage was done. Either his team-mates at the other table were good, or our team-mates had a bit of a bad day, (or more likely, a bit of both), but in the sessions where Elwood and I felt we had done well and expected to get some ground back, the gains didn’t materialize. Now, the elimination margin was 7 IMPs, but that was between us and them. So in fact, if we had managed a 4 IMP swing somewhere, +4 to us and -4 to them would have squeaked us through. In twenty four boards, there can’t have been more than about a dozen opportunities for such a swing.
Meanwhile, the third team comprised fellow Manhattan Bridge Clubbers, and Elwood and I were a little nervous about facing them, judging them to be a pretty strong team by flight B standards. And yet we did to them what the other team did to us, score-wise. A big second quarter opened a lead that they never looked like closing. In this case, the swings came from a misplayed game and from better judgement in the bidding. We got swings of 6, 5, and 4 IMPs by going plus at both tables when the pair at our table over-reached or over-competed.
Oh well.
Friday, January 16, 2009
Misadventures In Manhattan
The guy I play with on Thursday nights had his routine radically disturbed one way or another over the past few weeks. So when I sat down to play with him last night, it wasn’t just our first game of 2009, it was actually the first game with him for a month. And the computer seemed to want to celebrate by giving us some weird stuff.
The obligatory punt had to wait for the second half.
N E S W
1♠ pass 2♣ pass
2♥ pass 3NT pass
6♠ all pass
It’s your lead from:
♠7 6 ♥ 10 6 3 2 ♦ K J 8 6 4 3 ♣ Q
So what’ll it be? (The full hand is a bit further down).
In the first half we seemed to be trapped in a world of clubs. Five times the contract was 3♣, and on a sixth board it was 5♣-2 and arguably we should have been in 3♣. That’s a quarter of the boards in one contract – definitely odd. In the third round, one of the non-3♣ boards was when we doubled the opponents in 4♥.
N E S W
Pass pass 1♦ 3♥
3♠ pass pass 4♥
?
You hold:
♠10 7 6 3 2 ♥ - ♦ K 10 6 ♣ A Q J 8 4
You’ve mouse-trapped yourself, of course. If you had bid 4♣ over 3♥, you would be bidding 4♠ like a shot. Now you’re somewhat stuck. But you have an ace and a king; partner opened, and he doesn’t usually get too frisky in third seat; you have a void in trumps, and West hasn’t bid like someone with a nine-card suit (although bidding again is a bit suspicious), so maybe partner has a nice surprise in the trump suit. So you whack them.
And as usual, West does indeed have a nine-card suit, solidified by his partner’s singleton queen. And the 1=9=1=2 distribution delivers a tenth trick when dummy has the ♣K – if the doubleton had been somewhere else, even a nine-card suit wouldn’t have been enough.
Even more droll is the traveler – you open it, and announce “flat”. -590, -590, -590 – what a start.
Now back to that slam. I’m going to call this my slam try – you bid the slam, then try to make it.
N-S Game, dlr N
♠ A K Q J 9 8 5 2
♥ Q J 8 4
♦ -
♣ 10
♠ 10 4 3 ♠ 7 6
♥ K 9 [ ] ♥ 10 6 3 2
♦ 10 9 7 ♦ K J 8 6 4 3
♣ A J 6 5 4 ♣ Q
♠ -
♥ A 7 5
♦ A Q 5 2
♣ K 9 8 7 3 2
N E S W
1♠ pass 2♣ pass
2♥ pass 3NT pass
6♠ all pass
West clearly shouldn’t lead a major suit on this bidding. I think it’s pretty obvious that if North has a loser outside the majors, you need to try and cash it at trick one. Maybe North was encouraged by a club fit, so West led a diamond, which might have been correct. But it wasn’t, so the club loser disappeared and 6♠ rolled home. Pretty brutal, really.
The obligatory punt had to wait for the second half.
N E S W
1♠ pass 2♣ pass
2♥ pass 3NT pass
6♠ all pass
It’s your lead from:
♠7 6 ♥ 10 6 3 2 ♦ K J 8 6 4 3 ♣ Q
So what’ll it be? (The full hand is a bit further down).
In the first half we seemed to be trapped in a world of clubs. Five times the contract was 3♣, and on a sixth board it was 5♣-2 and arguably we should have been in 3♣. That’s a quarter of the boards in one contract – definitely odd. In the third round, one of the non-3♣ boards was when we doubled the opponents in 4♥.
N E S W
Pass pass 1♦ 3♥
3♠ pass pass 4♥
?
You hold:
♠10 7 6 3 2 ♥ - ♦ K 10 6 ♣ A Q J 8 4
You’ve mouse-trapped yourself, of course. If you had bid 4♣ over 3♥, you would be bidding 4♠ like a shot. Now you’re somewhat stuck. But you have an ace and a king; partner opened, and he doesn’t usually get too frisky in third seat; you have a void in trumps, and West hasn’t bid like someone with a nine-card suit (although bidding again is a bit suspicious), so maybe partner has a nice surprise in the trump suit. So you whack them.
And as usual, West does indeed have a nine-card suit, solidified by his partner’s singleton queen. And the 1=9=1=2 distribution delivers a tenth trick when dummy has the ♣K – if the doubleton had been somewhere else, even a nine-card suit wouldn’t have been enough.
Even more droll is the traveler – you open it, and announce “flat”. -590, -590, -590 – what a start.
Now back to that slam. I’m going to call this my slam try – you bid the slam, then try to make it.
N-S Game, dlr N
♠ A K Q J 9 8 5 2
♥ Q J 8 4
♦ -
♣ 10
♠ 10 4 3 ♠ 7 6
♥ K 9 [ ] ♥ 10 6 3 2
♦ 10 9 7 ♦ K J 8 6 4 3
♣ A J 6 5 4 ♣ Q
♠ -
♥ A 7 5
♦ A Q 5 2
♣ K 9 8 7 3 2
N E S W
1♠ pass 2♣ pass
2♥ pass 3NT pass
6♠ all pass
West clearly shouldn’t lead a major suit on this bidding. I think it’s pretty obvious that if North has a loser outside the majors, you need to try and cash it at trick one. Maybe North was encouraged by a club fit, so West led a diamond, which might have been correct. But it wasn’t, so the club loser disappeared and 6♠ rolled home. Pretty brutal, really.
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
Defensive conventions
There are a few competitive/defensive treatments that need to be documented.
Flannery is an opening 2D bid that shows five hearts and four spades and 11-15hcp. The idea is that such hands pose the most difficulty for systems that use 5-card major openings with the 1NT response forcing, because they are not strong enough for opener to reverse, and so over 1NT he may be forced to rebid 2C on a doubleton – hardly descriptive. If such hands are separated out of the 1H opening, they can be bid conveniently, while the forcing no-trump complex becomes cleaner. (While this is true, the cost – using up the 2D opening – really doesn’t appear worth the benefit, to most experts).
There are variations: some play that the Flannery bid includes 4-6 hands. It is also possible to play Flannery as a non-forcing 2H opening, rather than a forcing 2D opening. Neither variation poses any additional problems for the defence.
While we don’t meet Flannery very often, we should have a defensive approach defined. As per Elwood, over 2D we play
• Double – shows diamonds, equivalent to a 2D overcall of a 1H opening
• 2H – take-out of hearts, showing support for the other three suits (including spades), equivalent to a double of a 1H opening
• 2S – both minors, equivalent to 2NT against a 1H opening
• 2NT – natural, equivalent to 1NT over a 1H opening, but a bit stronger, say 17-19hcp
This is straightforward, really, although the only time (so far) it has come up playing with Elwood, I forgot. That’s the main reason for getting it down in writing.
Unusual over Unusual is a more commonly-occurring treatment.
Over a one-level opening, a 2NT overcall is the Unusual No Trump, showing the two lowest unbid suits, at least 5-5. Since opener has bid one suit and the opponents have shown two, responder only really has three active courses of action: to attempt to penalize the opponents, to support opener, or to show the fourth suit. The intent to penalize the opponents can be demonstrated by doubling the 2NT bid. This should indicate a willingness to make a penalty double of at least one of overcaller’s suits, and implies not too much fit with opener’s suit.
When it comes to bidding our suit(s), there is a problem in that it would be nice to have both a merely competitive raise and an invitational raise, but we have been crowded to the three-level. However, by way of compensation, we have two cue-bids available. In the ordinary overcall situation, an immediate raise to the three-level is pre-emptive, and a cue-bid of the overcall is limit+. For example, 1H – (2C) – 3H is pre-emptive, and 1H – (2C) – 3C is a limit raise of hearts (or better). In the Unusual situation, the lower cue-bid shows the lower of our suits, and the higher cue-bid shows the higher suit, while direct bids are merely competing. Examples:
1H – (2NT) – 3C is a limit raise or better of hearts
1H – (2NT) – 3H is pre-emptive
1H – (2NT) – 3S is not forcing
1H – (2NT) – 3D shows spades and a tolerance for hearts, invitational-plus strength.
1D – (2NT) – 3C is a limit raise or better of diamonds
1D – (2NT) – 3H shows spades and a tolerance for diamonds, invitational-plus strength.
This treatment can be extended to use against any overcall method that specifies both suits. For example, Michaels over a minor suit opening to show both majors:
1C – (2C) – 2H is a limit raise or better of clubs
1C – (2C) – 2S shows diamonds and a tolerance for clubs, invitational-plus strength
1C – (2C) – 2D, 1C – (2C) – 3C, and 1C – (2C) – 3D are all just competing.
When only one suit is exactly specified, it doesn’t apply. For example, Michaels over a major:
1H – (2H) – 2S is a limit-plus raise of hearts, but there is no second cue-bid available because overcaller’s minor suit is not known.
Flannery is an opening 2D bid that shows five hearts and four spades and 11-15hcp. The idea is that such hands pose the most difficulty for systems that use 5-card major openings with the 1NT response forcing, because they are not strong enough for opener to reverse, and so over 1NT he may be forced to rebid 2C on a doubleton – hardly descriptive. If such hands are separated out of the 1H opening, they can be bid conveniently, while the forcing no-trump complex becomes cleaner. (While this is true, the cost – using up the 2D opening – really doesn’t appear worth the benefit, to most experts).
There are variations: some play that the Flannery bid includes 4-6 hands. It is also possible to play Flannery as a non-forcing 2H opening, rather than a forcing 2D opening. Neither variation poses any additional problems for the defence.
While we don’t meet Flannery very often, we should have a defensive approach defined. As per Elwood, over 2D we play
• Double – shows diamonds, equivalent to a 2D overcall of a 1H opening
• 2H – take-out of hearts, showing support for the other three suits (including spades), equivalent to a double of a 1H opening
• 2S – both minors, equivalent to 2NT against a 1H opening
• 2NT – natural, equivalent to 1NT over a 1H opening, but a bit stronger, say 17-19hcp
This is straightforward, really, although the only time (so far) it has come up playing with Elwood, I forgot. That’s the main reason for getting it down in writing.
Unusual over Unusual is a more commonly-occurring treatment.
Over a one-level opening, a 2NT overcall is the Unusual No Trump, showing the two lowest unbid suits, at least 5-5. Since opener has bid one suit and the opponents have shown two, responder only really has three active courses of action: to attempt to penalize the opponents, to support opener, or to show the fourth suit. The intent to penalize the opponents can be demonstrated by doubling the 2NT bid. This should indicate a willingness to make a penalty double of at least one of overcaller’s suits, and implies not too much fit with opener’s suit.
When it comes to bidding our suit(s), there is a problem in that it would be nice to have both a merely competitive raise and an invitational raise, but we have been crowded to the three-level. However, by way of compensation, we have two cue-bids available. In the ordinary overcall situation, an immediate raise to the three-level is pre-emptive, and a cue-bid of the overcall is limit+. For example, 1H – (2C) – 3H is pre-emptive, and 1H – (2C) – 3C is a limit raise of hearts (or better). In the Unusual situation, the lower cue-bid shows the lower of our suits, and the higher cue-bid shows the higher suit, while direct bids are merely competing. Examples:
1H – (2NT) – 3C is a limit raise or better of hearts
1H – (2NT) – 3H is pre-emptive
1H – (2NT) – 3S is not forcing
1H – (2NT) – 3D shows spades and a tolerance for hearts, invitational-plus strength.
1D – (2NT) – 3C is a limit raise or better of diamonds
1D – (2NT) – 3H shows spades and a tolerance for diamonds, invitational-plus strength.
This treatment can be extended to use against any overcall method that specifies both suits. For example, Michaels over a minor suit opening to show both majors:
1C – (2C) – 2H is a limit raise or better of clubs
1C – (2C) – 2S shows diamonds and a tolerance for clubs, invitational-plus strength
1C – (2C) – 2D, 1C – (2C) – 3C, and 1C – (2C) – 3D are all just competing.
When only one suit is exactly specified, it doesn’t apply. For example, Michaels over a major:
1H – (2H) – 2S is a limit-plus raise of hearts, but there is no second cue-bid available because overcaller’s minor suit is not known.
Sunday, January 11, 2009
Weak Two Bids
Happy new year everybody. Let's start with some more system notes.
There are some bids that “everybody” plays, so you might wonder what needs to get documented. In ACBL-land, weak twos, especially in the majors, fall into that category. Playing with Elwood has opened my eyes.
The standard for opening a weak two varies wildly, depending on who you ask. Some people treat the bids as purely destructive, and are willing to open on almost any garbage, even not-that-great five-card suits. Some people are quite strict, imposing restrictions on suit quality and other features of the distribution. Elwood runs closer to the wild side than I do, but is more disciplined than many I know. He regards two-bids as belonging in the spectrum of pre-emptive hands, and judges whether to open based on likely tricks and losers, taking into account the vulnerability and so on. That means he doesn’t have hard and fast rules about suit length or suit quality or point count, but on the other hand, if he judges correctly, you aren’t likely to make a killing off a penalty double of him either. I am a bit more old-fashioned, and consider the openings more like the bottom tier of constructive bidding. Therefore I will have prospects of a defensive trick, and I generally try to follow the old standard of “two of the top three or three of the top five”, at least in first and second seat. I have been known to open on a five-card suit, but the few times I’ve done it, it was a very good suit, AKQxx or better, and the strategic situation seemed to call for extra effort. I think I’ve opened two on a seven-card suit, also, but that would be even rarer. (I usually take any excuse to open a weak three-bid, and at that level I tend to be much wilder than Elwood).
When I first played weak twos, many moons ago, we played step responses that are known these days as Ogust. Most common now seems to be the idea of using 2NT to ask for an outside feature, defined to be an ace or a king. Rather than choose between these methods, Elwood plays both. So we have that 2NT asks for a feature, and a 3C response is Ogust: opener rebids
• 3D = bad hand, bad suit
• 3H = bad hand good suit
• 3S = good hand, bad suit
• 3NT = good hand, good suit
Responses in a new suit, other than the 3C ask, are natural and forcing. Direct raises are to be considered as raising the pre-empt, and opener should not be encouraged.
When the opponents interfere, we use an approach generally known as McCabe. After 2x – (dble) - ?, a new suit is lead-directing, and opener is expected to return to three of his own suit. This hasn’t come up yet, but it sounds like a useful weapon. After some discussion, we decided to keep 2NT as a feature-ask. The alternative was to use it for a relay, with the idea that responder is running to a suit of his own which he deems a better idea than staying with opener’s suit. It’s a close call – neither use seems likely to come up, to be honest. The other call to be defined is a redouble. Elwood had a little menu of possible meanings, and I chose the one he didn’t expect. Redouble shows Ax or Kx in opener’s suit, and a good hand. I picked that meaning because it seemed to me to fit the lead-directing strategy – responder is really telling the opener that it’s OK to lead small away from his suit.
Now all we need is some aggressive opponents.
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